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Executive Summary
Russian elites are worried. The economic recession, Western sanctions, and semi-isolation are endangering the personal 
and professional interests of most of the upper 
middle classes, scientific and cultural elites, top-
ranking administrators, and small and medium 
entrepreneurs. The new confrontational course in 
relations with Western countries undermines the 
Putin leadership’s “contract” with elites and the 
middle class: enrich yourselves and leave the rest to 
us. The good years are over. Even a rise in oil prices 
will not ensure return to steady growth and higher 
salaries anytime soon.
Do new uncertainties have an impact on elites’ 
submission to the regime? Most of them remain 
loyal so far, but nonetheless do not trust Putin’s 
confrontational strategy. They have much to lose 
from more domestic agitation and estrangement 
from Western economies. Temporary exile is 
another response; the number of the elites settled 
in Western countries and in Ukraine should 
preoccupy the regime. Political protest and 
economic resistance may gain momentum inside 
Russia.
The hyper-nationalist propaganda creates fear, 
xenophobia, and populist retrenchment in a large 
section of the public, but this hysteria may be short-
lived. People’s emotions are volatile and Russia is a 
diverse and uneven country, struggling with social 
inequalities nationwide and insecurity in the North 
Caucasus. High ratings for Putin in opinion polls 
are abundantly publicized to veil rising anxiety in 
upper echelons of society. 
Elites beyond Putin’s inner circle are excluded 
from the decision-making. They cannot express 
their opinions publicly about armed engagement 
in Ukraine and Syria, nor are they consulted about 
political legislation or economic choices. Power 
rests in the inner circle and the siloviki. 
In struggling against the new odds, the Russian 
leadership is using three major instruments: foreign 
policy adventurism and nationalist propaganda; 
economic emergency plans that prioritize of 
investment and spending in the immediately 
lucrative sectors of hydrocarbons, the arms 
industry, and agro-business; and semi-autarchy, 
served by repression, corruption, and intense media 
and Internet control.
Foreign policy as a distraction from domestic 
stagnation is a dangerous tactic; so is domestic 
retrenchment that alienates the most dynamic, 
innovative, and productive elements of elites and 
society. Western governments will continue to 
negotiate with the current leadership, but should 
also engage with alternative elites.
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Introduction1
The combination 
of recession and 
semi-isolation 
since the Ukraine 
conflict of 2014 
jeopardizes the 
interests of many 
in the upper 
middle class, the 
scientific and 
cultural elite, 
and the middle 
administration, 
as well as small 
and medium 
entrepreneurs.
Russia’s elites and upper middle class are worried. Economic prospects look dim, exchanges with foreign partners are at a 
historical low, and the Kremlin leadership’s course 
is unclear and unpredictable. The combination 
of recession and semi-isolation since the Ukraine 
conflict of 2014 jeopardizes the interests of many in 
the upper middle class, the scientific and cultural 
elite, and the middle administration, as well as 
small and medium entrepreneurs. These upper 
echelons of society, beyond the Kremlin and ruling 
circles, are particularly concerned, as they find 
themselves put off balance by decisions from above 
that they cannot influence.
This paper addresses the question of the adjustment 
capacity of professional and cultural elites. It adopts 
a broad economic and sociological definition of 
elites, but leaves aside the Kremlin inner circle, 
the top oligarchs, and the siloviki, i.e. those in the 
“force structures” — the army, police, Interior 
Ministry, intelligence services, and judiciary. A 
foreign scholar has virtually no access to the “ruling 
elites” and must rely on secondary sources, rumors, 
and deduction to guess their attitudes. This paper, 
therefore, focuses on the upper middle class and 
elites that do not belong to the ruling oligarchic 
system or “power organs.” 
Further away from the center of President Vladimir 
Putin’s constellation, a few million Russians enjoy 
better living standards, higher education, and 
greater responsibilities in the economy and public 
life than the rest of society. They live in major 
cities, speak English, travel abroad (when permitted 
to leave the homeland),1 and often trust foreign 
institutions more than Russia’s for their savings, 
their health, and their children’s education. They 
are affected, in their professional and private life, by 
the leadership’s policies and attitudes. Among them, 
1 Since 2014, the Russian authorities have adopted a number of 
measures that restrict free travel and access to foreign capitals; 
restrictions particularly apply to functionaries.
a significant number are used to relating to the 
“ruling system” in different ways: a lawyer defends 
a big magnate, a doctor works in an elite clinic, a 
town mayor engages with higher administrative 
echelons, a media director or journalist talks 
with the powers-that-be, a rector depends on 
state money to run his university, a high-profile 
scientist works in a state research institute. In 2016, 
all interactions are more complex and distrustful 
than before. The contours of this upper layer of the 
middle class are blurred and changing, depending 
on economic ups and downs and on proximity to or 
estrangement from decision-making. Undoubtedly, 
those few million individuals’ willingness, or 
incapacity, to remain loyal to the Putin regime 
holds considerable significance for the short and 
medium term development of Russia.2
In the early 2000s, Putin successfully struck a tacit 
deal with Russian society: “live better, vote for me, 
and stay quiet,” and an open deal with the business 
class and intelligentsia: “enrich yourselves, enrich 
the state, but keep away from politics.” Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest in October 2003, and the 
dismantling of his oil company, Yukos, set the rule. 
Today, the leadership-elites contract may prove 
more difficult to hold than the leadership-society 
agreement. It has come under strain with economic 
recession, and hard choices must be made between 
immediate interests and longer-term calculations. 
2 The study of Russian elites is not an easy task, given the rapidly 
increasing opaqueness and repression of any dissident voice. But 
it is a key issue, as tensions mount inside the inner circle and 
among economic and administrative elites. People talk more 
freely when abroad, or under condition of anonymity at home. 
Many Russian intellectuals, scientists, economists, journalists, 
entrepreneurs, former politicians, and opposition leaders spend 
time in Western countries, or settle there, at least for a time. 
They try to grasp our perceptions of the situation, and wonder 
what their future will be in the case of a prolonged Putin rule, 
or in the event of an early succession. Several of them (about 30 
people) shared their analysis with the author in conversations 
held in Washington, New York, Paris, and Moscow in the first 
half of 2016.
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Non-ruling elites face three options: exit, voice, 
or loyalty.3 Exile is depriving Russian cities of 
their best minds and most dynamic elements. 
Open protest is risky, but passive resistance to 
the system may be growing. As for loyalty, it is 
a matter of adjustment to the new demands and 
constraints imposed by the leadership in a context 
of uncertainty and weak economic returns.
3 A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline 
in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1970). In his 1970 study of responses to decline, 
Hirschman proposed a model for analyzing elites’ choices of 
strategy when faced with new odds and danger: exit, voice, or 
loyalty. It is precisely these three options that Russian elites are 
faced with, and this is often the way they formulate their possible 
choices.
Russian Elites Are Worried 3
In 2016, the 
country is still 
struggling with 
a perfect storm: 
low oil and gas 
prices; shrinking 
GDP and reserves; 
a critical lack 
of investments, 
declining returns, 
and an oversized 
state sector; and 
a weak currency 
and limited import 
substitution.
Economic Turmoil, Political 
Retrenchment2
Recession
In 2014, Putin put his country at risk. He challenged Ukrainian and European security, while Russia faced economic hardship and 
social disarray at home. It is important to recall 
that the Russian economy started to slow down as 
early as 2009, and entered a phase of recession in 
2013, before the fall of Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych and the conflict with Kyiv.4 Similarly, 
the authorities engaged in harsh repression of 
political protest and opposition leaders immediately 
after Putin’s return to the presidential office in May 
2012,5 at a time of difficult relations with Western 
powers over Syria, and of emerging tensions with 
European states over the Eastern Partnership of 
the European Union (the six states between Russia 
and the EU — Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan).6 
In 2016, the country is still struggling with a perfect 
storm: low oil and gas prices; shrinking GDP and 
reserves; a critical lack of investments, declining 
returns, and an oversized state sector; and a weak 
currency and limited import substitution.7 Russian 
and non-Russian economists alike agree on the 
4 S. Guriev, “Political Origins and Implications of the Economic 
Crisis in Russia,” in L. Aron, ed., Putin’s Russia: How It Rose, How 
It Is Maintained, and How It Might End (Washington: American 
Enterprise Institute, May 2015).
5 On the eve of Vladimir Putin’s inauguration, May 6, 2012, a 
peaceful opposition demonstration was brutally disbanded and 
dozens participants were arrested and prosecuted; several defen-
dants have been condemned to long prison sentences. 
6 On the Eastern Partnership and EU-Russia relations, see N. 
Babayan, “The In-Betweeners: The Eastern Partnership Coun-
tries and the Russia-West Conflict,” Transatlantic Academy, 
April 2016, http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/
betweeners-eastern-partnership-countries-and-russia-west-
conflict. 
7 A. Ovsyanikova, “Moscow’s authoritarian future,” Open 
Democracy Russia, March 9, 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.
net/od-russia/anastasiya-ovsyannikova/moscow-s-authori-
tarian-future: “the public sector in Russia is colossal, and still 
growing. According to the IMF, in 2014 the public sector’s share 
of GDP exceeded 70 percent, and according to RBC [Russian 
business reporting service], it made up to 30 percent of employ-
ment, putting Russia fifth in the world in terms of public sector 
employment.” In conversations in Moscow in May 2016, experts 
magnitude of the crisis, and the improbability 
of a significant restart any time soon. As Birgit 
Hansl, the World Bank’s lead economist for the 
Russian Federation, explains, “policy uncertainty 
is the biggest obstacle to investment and consumer 
decisions.” She emphasizes the fiscal problem: 
“Policy space for fiscal adjustment narrowed 
as fiscal buffers declined, requiring a strategic 
restructuring of expenditures and less reliance on 
oil revenues.”8 Chris Miller has shown how Russia 
lost much of its energy and economic leverage in 
recent years.9 Mikhail Dmitriev, deputy minister 
for economic development and trade in the early 
2000s, sees possible ways out of the crisis, as Russia 
has important reserves and resources, but agrees 
that the political situation, with a stifled non-
pluralist system, is the major stumbling block. 
Andrei Kolesnikov at Carnegie Moscow Center 
argues along the same lines and concludes that the 
regime has no strategy.10
Protectionist Temptation
The more protectionist government policies are, the 
less competitive Russian production and markets 
and businessmen agreed on the lack of incentives to invest and 
the limited import substitution in important sectors.
8 B. Hansl, “The New World Bank’s Russia Economic Report: The 
Long Journey to Recovery,” presentation at Johns Hopkins-SAIS, 
May 6, 2016. Author’s notes.
9 C. Miller, “Why Russia’s Economic Leverage is Declining,” 
Transatlantic Academy, April 2016, http://www.
transatlanticacademy.org/publications/why-russia%E2%80%99s-
economic-leverage-declining. 
10 M. Dmitriev, presentation at “Understanding Russia: A 
Tryout for the European Union,” CIDOB, Real Instituto Elcano, 
and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Madrid, July 2, 2015, http://
www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/
event?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/
calendar/activities/understanding-russia-tryout-european-
union; see also his presentation “Russian Society and the 
Economic Turning Point: Opportunities Missed, Opportunities 
Taken,” Chatham House, London, April 13, 2016, https://www.
chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/2016-04-13-dmi-
triev-presentation.pdf; A. Kolesnikov, “The Russian Regime 
in 2015: All Tactics, No Strategy,” Carnegie Moscow Center, 
September 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Article_
Kolesnikov_Sept_2015_Eng.pdf.
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Most liberal 
experts doubt that 
the Kremlin has 
any genuine desire 
to engage in even 
limited reforms.
will be. Research and development will continue 
to lag behind major Western and Asian countries. 
Sergei Guriev, former rector of the New Economic 
School, now exiled and teaching at Sciences Po 
in Paris, writes that sanctions have made a bad 
situation worse: “Western sanctions imposed 
after the annexation of Crimea have isolated 
Russia from global markets, and Russia’s counter-
sanctions, the country’s retaliatory embargo on 
Western agricultural imports and fish, have only 
compounded the problem.... Russia’s inability to 
borrow has led to a dramatic depreciation of the 
ruble and fall in real incomes and wages.”11 In the 
opinion of most Russian economists, the situation 
is not currently reversible. A recovery calls for 
quick action, followed by structural reforms, 
and of course political will. But they doubt the 
Kremlin’s political commitment to reforms. In the 
near future, Russia will not attract urgently needed 
investment, domestic or foreign. This is the Achilles 
heel of its economy and precludes any foreseeable 
improvement soon. 
Criticism of this new form of “stagnation” now 
shakes the Moscow Establishment. German Gref, 
president of Sberbank and former Russian economy 
minister, said openly at Davos early in 2016 that the 
Russian economy “must adapt,” otherwise it will 
lag behind. In April 2016, former Russian Finance 
Minister Alexei Kudrin, a longtime critic of the 
Putin-Medvedev tandem, reached an agreement 
with Putin to write up a new reform plan. He 
accepted the deputy chair of the president’s 
economic council. He cautioned, however, that 
no reform can succeed unless the authorities tone 
down the confrontation with the West. Most liberal 
experts doubt that the Kremlin has any genuine 
11 S. Guriev, “Russia’s Constrained Economy,” Foreign Affairs, 
May-June 2016, p. 19, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
russia-fsu/2016-04-18/russias-constrained-economy. See also his 
Carnegie brief, “Деглобализация России” [Russia’s De-global-
ization], Carnegie Moscow Center, January 26, 2016, http://
carnegie.ru/commentary/2016/01/26/ru-62541/it69. 
desire to engage in even limited reforms. Such 
reform programs have been laid out at various key 
moments during Putin’s tenure, but Moscow-based 
social scientist Kirill Rogov argues: “They exist to 
prevent anyone else from proposing political or 
economic alternatives. Whatever happens in reality 
(…), Putin makes sure to always have a progressive 
reform program on the table. He makes it clear 
that he just might implement it at any moment.”12 
Foreign observers are equally suspicious.13
Russia’s lack of economic attractiveness results 
mainly from the lack of trust in the administrative 
and justice systems, the government’s incapacity to 
fight corruption and entrenched quasi-monopolies, 
and stubborn resistance to international 
transparency and economic globalization, in a 
glaring contrast with another authoritarian state, 
China.14 Russia remains a semi-autarkic “economy 
of favors” with leadership and elites clinging to 
their privileges, even though it would be rational 
for many in business and finance to seek a rule-
of-law state that protects their assets and attracts 
credit and investment.15 Until a few years ago, 
12 K. Rogov, “Why Putin Tapped Kudrin to Write New 
Reforms Plan,” The Moscow Times, April 20, 2016, http://www.
themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putins-economist-why-
kudrin-tapped-to-write-new-reforms-plan-op-ed/566809.html. 
13 See K. Hille, “Kudrin’s resurrection fails to damp doubts on 
Russian reforms,” Financial Times, May 8, 2016, https://next.
ft.com/content/7f30cba8-13ae-11e6-91da-096d89bd2173; M. 
Domańska, “Kudrin is back: the pretence of reform in Russia,” 
Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), April 27, 2016, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-04-27/kudrin-back-
pretence-reform-russia.
14 S. Guriev, “Деглобализация России” [Russia’s Deglobaliza-
tion]. At an official event on Russia-China relations, organized 
by the Russian International Affairs Council in Moscow on 
May 31, 2016, Chinese speakers did not hide their confusion 
regarding at Moscow’s trade policies. They did not embrace the 
Russian catchword of import substitution. Author’s notes.
15 A. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking 
and Informal Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); A. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power 
Networks, and Informal Governance (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013); K. Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptoc-
racy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013). 
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the network-system and opaque rules benefited 
many in the upper echelons of society. A kind 
of omerta prevailed, by which secret deals and 
arrangements, hidden assets and flows of cash, 
were neither discussed not exposed publicly in 
Russia, except by a few detractors and courageous 
journalists and politicians.16 Since the Ukrainian 
conflict, and subsequent negative economic and 
political consequences for Russian business and 
intelligentsia, elites see the limits and costs of 
this network system and are faced with a difficult 
choice: exit, voice, or loyalty.
16 Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov published several reports 
on corruption in the 2000s. Ilya Yashin edited a report on 
Ramzan Kadyrov’s corrupt and violent regime in Chechnya 
in 2016. Novaya Gazeta continues to investigate political and 
economic violence, as well as abuse by military and police. 
Lawyer and political opponent Alexei Navalny, in a very hostile 
environment, keeps his Foundation to Fight Corruption and his 
blog going.
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Russian elites and 
the upper middle 
class do not 
form an obedient 
nomenklatura as 
existed in Soviet 
times. They are 
plural, fragmented, 
and not prone to 
collective action.
Elites’ attitudes depend to a large extent on signals coming from the top. This is self-evident for ruling elites that compose the 
power circles around Vladimir Putin or at the 
helm of key republics and regions of the Russian 
Federation. It is also true for more estranged 
elites, in Moscow and other cities, because they 
cannot devise their own plans without anticipating 
the leadership’s encouragement, indifference, or 
obstruction. The leadership wants no contestation 
of its supremacy and prefers a shrinking budget to 
a competitive economy. They might even prefer 
to push out their best elites, and lose the exiles’ 
intellectual and business input, rather than have to 
compromise with them. 
Elites’ Plurality 
Russian elites and the upper middle class do not 
form an obedient nomenklatura as existed in Soviet 
times. They are plural, fragmented, and not prone 
to collective action. A few excellent sociologists 
continue to undertake surveys of selected 
segments of the middle class.17 Articles and public 
interventions by Russian experts and advisers that 
serve or served the regime provide fruitful material 
for analysis. Most of them expose their doubts 
and concerns, as the crisis deepens and puts them 
at odds with long-time friends and colleagues 
that were pushed out of the establishment. Also, 
independent Internet publications, sites, and blogs 
offer a rich insight into the mood and attitudes of 
elites and engaged Russian citizens. Social networks 
17 A new Levada-Center survey, following the 2008 survey 
commissioned by the EU-Russia Centre in Brussels, gives an 
interesting insight. This 2015 survey, directed by Lev Gudkov, 
was commissioned by the Open Russia Foundation in London. 
This survey is not published, but was made available to the 
author; some of the findings can be found in articles on the 
Levada-Center website, http://www.levada.ru. See also M. Dmit-
riev, “Evolution of Values and Political Sentiment in Moscow 
and the Provinces,” in L. Aron, ed., Putin’s Russia, pp. 73-82; and 
the article written by a Levada sociologist, D. Volkov, “Russian 
Elite Opinion After Crimea,” Carnegie Moscow Center, March 
2016,  http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Volkov_WEB_
Eng.pdf.
host active discussions on current events and the 
evolution of the Putin regime.
Of all strata of society, urban upper middle classes 
are most hit by the new context of recession 
and semi-isolation from Western countries. On 
average, their incomes have fallen more sharply 
than those of lower middle class households. Other 
incomes have gone down as well, but reliable 
data are missing. The grey zone of the economy 
is expanding; consequently, the share of non-
declared activities, and incomes, is expanding too, 
and corruption remains unchecked. It has become 
difficult for small and medium enterprises, for 
liberal professions and non-state organizations 
to adjust to new constraints and limitations from 
above in a context where money is scarcer. If 
significant segments of the elites and upper middle 
class have managed to save their status, activities, 
and privileges, others face more hardships. Since 
2013, differentiation has been growing between 
cadres and managers paid by the state or state-
controlled business on one hand, and those paid by 
other employers or the self-employed, on the other. 
The former are, at present, better protected than 
the latter. The authorities try to increase salaries of 
those in strategic companies.18 For private business, 
small entrepreneurs in services, and liberal 
professions, insecurity is rising and alternative 
strategies are needed to fight the new odds. 
What constituted a relatively homogeneous and 
dynamic socioeconomic stratum is now under 
strain. Interviews conducted in Washington, 
London, and Moscow in the winter and spring 
of 2016 clearly point at this new trend among 
professional and cultural elites. For instance, a 
renowned Russian financial expert complains 
in harsh words, but off the record, about the 
government’s inability to offer reasonable 
18 Author’s conversations with Natalya Zubarevich, Washington, 
DC, February 2016, and with Dmitri Oreshkin, Moscow, May 
30, 2016.
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While a growing 
number of 
individuals 
dissociate 
themselves from 
Putin’s policies, 
they are a minority 
among the elites. 
Most prefer 
to keep a low 
profile and save 
what they can 
of their assets 
and position.
conditions for medium enterprises and banks 
to operate in Russia. A former deputy minister 
underlines the deterioration of market conditions 
and the net loss incurred on business as a result 
of inhibiting legislation and regulations. A U.S. 
consultant based in Moscow emphasizes the 
corrosive effect of undefined rules, unpredictable 
behavior, and unknown prospects. His clients 
express their concern about the sustainability 
of their business. While a growing number of 
individuals dissociate themselves from Putin’s 
policies, they are a minority among the elites. Most 
prefer to keep a low profile and save what they can 
of their assets and position.
Regional elites also fall prey to the general climate 
of suspicion and intrigues. A striking number of 
governors had to step down in 2014-16; several 
of them were prosecuted, including the governor 
of Tula, an important region for the military-
industrial complex, which is under total control 
of the Kremlin circle. In the North Caucasian 
republics, internal conflicts among the powerful 
aggravate poverty and insecurity. Loyalty to 
Moscow is bought by large subsidies to the ruling 
groups. Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya, 
is the only regional boss that can challenge the 
Kremlin leadership. He has built his own Pretorian 
guard and army, and is feared in Moscow. He is 
protected by Putin who, according to seasoned 
experts, is now a hostage of his own protégé, an 
uncontrollable despot in his own land.19 Vladimir 
Milov, a leader of the democratic opposition and 
former deputy minister of energy, underlines the 
19 See Novaya Gazeta articles on Chechnya, http://www.novaya-
gazeta.ru; I. Yashin, “Threat to National Security,” February 
2016, http://www.4freerussia.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/
Doklad_eng_web.pdf; D.N. Jensen, “Kadyrov, Putin, and the 
Whitewashing of the Nemtsov Investigation,” Institute of 
Modern Russia, September 14, 2015, http://imrussia.org/en/
analysis/politics/2409-kadyrov-putin-and-the-whitewashing-
of-the-nemtsov-investigation; Institute of Modern Russia, “13 
Takeaways from Ilya Yashin’s Kadyrov Report,” February 25, 
2016, http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/politics/2515-13-take-
aways-from-ilya-yashin’s-kadyrov-report.
disastrous effect of violence and corruption on 
Russian society, but believes that in many regions, 
notably in Siberia, legislative and local elections 
will be more honest and will challenge the regime’s 
centralization policy.20
Natalya Zubarevich, a political geographer who 
monitors regional disparities, has analyzed the 
widening gap between the affluent and the poor, 
rising inequalities between households, and the 
urban-rural divide. Disparities are increasing in 
the present period of budgetary constraints and 
distrust in the national economy.21 The recession 
pushed another 2.3 million Russians into poverty in 
the first nine months of 2015, according to official 
statistics. Kirill Rogov summarizes the predicament: 
“Moscow’s policy of confrontation with the West 
accelerated economic recession and social disarray; 
this deep crisis has a high cost, and drastically 
reduces the redistribution of dividends.”22 This is all 
the more so for elites and upper echelons of society, 
which have more at stake than the average Russian. 
How does the urban middle class tolerate Putin’s 
confrontational policies? How sustainable is the 
quiet acquiescence, or silent reprobation, of these 
Russians? They have three options: exit, voice, or 
loyalty.23
Exit: Temporary Diasporas
Exiles should preoccupy the regime. Since 
opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was shot dead 
20 Conversation with the author, Moscow, June 1, 2016. The next 
State Duma elections will be held on September 18, 2016.
21 Quoted in P. Goble, “Financial Instability In Russia’s Regions 
Already ‘Worse Than Default,’ Zubarevich,” Window On 
Eurasia, June 11, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/
financial-instability-in-russias-regions-already-worse-than-
default-zubarevich-says/, see also N. Zubarevich, “Four Russias 
and a New Political Reality,” in L. Aron, ed., Putin’s Russia, p. 
20-35.
22 K. Rogov, “Divided Elites,” presentation at a conference “Can 
Russian Elites Sustain Putin’s Foreign Policy?” Transatlantic 
Academy, Washington, DC, April 25, 2016. 
23 A.O. Hirschman, op. cit.
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in Moscow in February 2015, and with the siloviki 
capturing more and more power, a few more 
thousand intelligentsia, professional elites, and 
business people have settled in Western countries, 
Ukraine, and Asia. It seems that most of them 
maintain close ties with colleagues and friends in 
Russia — some go back to Russia for short periods 
— and consider their exile temporary. A number 
of engaged intellectuals and activists continue to 
monitor Russian politics closely and hope to play 
a role in their country again after the Putin system 
has ended.
Temporary diasporas are a new challenge for the 
Kremlin. To live, work, and find success outside 
Russia, with the project of returning to Russia, is 
a strategy that many exiles now pursue. Among 
them, a significant number are in semi-exile, 
keeping a part in activities in Russia and going back 
and forth. During the 1990s, when the economic 
situation was particularly dismal, Russian citizens 
were tempted by exile, but only a happy few had the 
financial means to accomplish it. A second wave 
of emigration surged in the mid-2000s. Scientists, 
artists, intellectuals, and businessmen wanted to 
work and earn in the West, without cutting ties with 
the homeland. This is when Londongrad emerged, 
and Berlin and a few other Western cities welcomed 
more and more Russians. Affluent businessmen 
invested in secluded, premium real estate, and 
sometimes settled down, or at least settled their 
families. Most of them express support for Putin.
Now a third wave is leaving Russia. This exodus 
began in 2012 and is composed mostly of elites 
and the upper middle class who fear prosecution 
or harassment, and do not see how they could 
continue to live and work productively in their 
country. A particular feature of these temporary 
diasporas is that they communicate constantly with 
the “home elites,” the old friends and colleagues. 
Networks function across borders. And the most 
engaged are devising alternative policies for when a 
new government replaces the current leadership.24 
London is the strategic center where Khodorkovsky 
and other Putin opponents, along with lawyers, 
businessmen, journalists, and intellectuals, meet 
and discuss alternative policies for Russia. U.S. 
financier William Browder is a loud voice among 
the London detractors of Putin. His lawyer, Sergei 
Magnitsky died in pre-trial detention under 
inhumane conditions in Moscow in 2009.25
In Washington, New York, London, Paris, and other 
capitals, many scholars, journalists, and activists, as 
well as people in business or banking, are looking 
for jobs or fellowships in order to prepare for their 
exit from the motherland. It is also a challenge for 
the Kremlin that more and more elites settle down 
in former Soviet cities: Tallinn, Vilnius, Riga — and 
Kyiv! Others choose Warsaw or Prague. Proximity 
to Russia and familiar languages, as well as relatively 
cheap housing make these attractive destinations. 
The new emigration wave has attracted media 
attention in Russia. It is interesting that the official 
publication Russia Beyond the Headlines gives a 
critical analysis of the reasons why elites have to 
leave their country: 
“In June 2015, businessman Dmitry 
Zimin, founder of the VimpelCom 
telecommunications company and an 
important patron of science and education, 
left Russia. Many linked his departure 
to the scandal surrounding his scientific 
and educational organization, Dynasty 
Foundation, which on May 25, 2015 was 
24 At his foundation Open Russia, Khodorkovsky organizes 
talks and publications. One of the latest reports is E. Lukya-
nova, I. Shablinsky, and V. Pastukhov, “Constitutional Crisis in 
Russia and How to Resolve It,” Institute of Modern Russia and 
Open Russia, 2016, http://imrussia.org/images/stories/Reports/
Constitutional_Crisis/IMR_Constitutional_Crisis_in_Russia_
And_How_to_Resolve_It.pdf. 
25 B. Browder, Red Notice: A True Story of High Finance, Murder, 
and One Man’s Fight for Justice (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2015). 
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declared to be a ‘foreign agent’ in accordance 
with a controversial Russian law requiring 
organizations receiving funding from abroad 
to be referred to as such.”26 
The article mentions a very different case of 
forced emigration: Yevgenia Chirikova, a leading 
ecological activist, who decided to settle in Estonia 
with her family. Chirikova became prominent in 
Russia during the 2010 summer of deadly wildfires 
that devastated many regions, and caused several 
thousand casualties, which she claimed could have 
been prevented had local and central authorities 
been up to the task. Since she participated in 
popular protest against the Putin regime in 2011-
12, she has been a victim of harassment, and finally 
chose exile in the spring of 2016.27
A map of Russian communities abroad shows how 
the successive waves of emigration in the last century 
produced important centers of Russian presence in 
a number of countries.28 The Institute of Modern 
Russia in New York monitors the exile phenomenon 
more broadly, beyond the elites and intellectual 
circles. They quote official data showing that in 
the first eight months of 2014, 203,600 people left 
Russia, compared with 186,400 in all of 2013, and 
anticipated that more Russians would leave in 2014 
than in the previous record high year of 1999, when 
215,000 left. However, as Vladimir Milov clarifies, 
a significant part of this migration flow concerns 
residents of Russia that move back to Central Asian 
republics, but may continue to spend time in Russia 
26 Y. Sinelschikova, “The politics of emigration: Why are 
Russians packing their bags again?,“ Russia Beyond the Head-
lines, June 24, 2015, http://rbth.com/politics/2015/06/24/
the_politics_of_emigration_why_are_russians_packing_their_
bags_again_47215.html.
27 Yevgenia Chirikova was a guest at Sciences Po, and at the 
National Assembly in Paris in 2012 and 2013.
28 See P. Goble, “Moscow seeking to make Russian diaspora a 
Soviet-style political weapon against West,” Euromaidan Press, 
February 2, 2015, http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/02/02/
moscow-seeking-to-make-russian-diaspora-a-soviet-style-polit-
ical-weapon-against-west/#arvlbdata. 
(e.g. workers that go back and forth from Uzbekistan 
or Kazakhstan). Furthermore, these figures do not 
distinguish emigration from semi-exile, i.e. the many 
thousands of residents who return home regularly, 
but no longer work in Russia.29
Voice
The regime is concerned with political opposition, 
and has adopted unprecedented repressive 
measures to thwart public expressions of protest. 
Street demonstrations are rarely approved by 
city authorities; even a one-person picket with 
a political sign is not tolerated. Opposition 
movements cannot register as parties. The “party 
of power,” United Russia, receives constant 
television coverage; none of the other parties do. 
Putin is afraid of “color revolutions” and wants to 
reduce political opposition to a trickle. Repressive 
measures, prosecution, asset grabbing, and threats 
have fallen on most leading figures since 2012.30
Internet and social media have been playing 
a key role as providers of information and 
communication. Urban protest in 2011-2012 
mobilized online, and political forces campaigned 
on the web. Many sensitive issues were discussed, 
including fraud and corruption at the top. Since 
then, the authorities have been clamping down on 
sites and blogs, significantly curtailing freedom of 
expression and information. Andrei Soldatov and 
Irina Borogan give a thorough analysis of the “Red 
Web,” tightly monitored, and subverted, by tens 
of thousands of zealous Federal Security Service 
29 See K. Semenova, “A New Emigration: The Best Are 
Leaving. Part 1,” Institute of Modern Russia, April 7, 2015, 
http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/nation/2224-a-new-emigra-
tion-the-best-are-leaving-part-1. See Vladimir Milov’s 
Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/milov.vladimir/
posts/934506833287659.
30 M. Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir 
Putin (New York: Public Affairs, 2016); S.L. Myers, The New 
Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2015). 
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(FSB) and paid trolls.31 The regime does not want 
any serious contest in the parliamentary elections 
scheduled for September 18, 2016. The Council 
of Europe, of which Russia is a member, has been 
refused electoral monitoring.32 
The leadership has focused on political opposition, 
but it should pay more attention to social protest. In 
recent years, local unrest, strikes, sit-ins, and open 
criticism of local authorities have become part of 
social life. Such episodes will occur more and more 
often as the situation deteriorates. Will the central 
authorities put the blame on local administrations 
and employers, and antagonize them further? Will 
they try to negotiate directly with the dissatisfied? 
In this respect, Putin’s April 2016 annual 
“conversation with the people” is quite telling. 
Hundreds of citizens asked questions of their 
president, via video links, and often complained 
about late salaries payments, corruption of officials, 
lay-offs, etc. The president listened to complaints 
and requests, took good note of them — and 
ordered his administration to solve all the issues 
presented to him. Some cases were trifles, other 
disclosed high-level misrule and corruption, for 
example, the Vostochny Cosmodrome construction 
scandal, in which wide-spread corruption 
was uncovered at Russia’s multi-billion dollar 
spaceport.33
31 A. Soldatov and I. Borogan, The Red Web: The Struggle Between 
Russian Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries 
(New York: PublicAffairs, 2015).
32 The Council of Europe stripped Russia of its voting rights after 
the annexation of Crimea, but Russia remains a member.
33 In 2009, the authorities decided to build a space center in 
the Far East of Russia in order to reduce dependency on the 
Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. The construction works 
were marred by scandals and strikes, and many imperfections 
made the project far costlier than expected. The first space 
launch took place in April 2016 from the yet-to-be-completed 
facility. M. Mirovalev, “The bumpy road to Vostochny, Russia’s 
new multibillion-dollar spaceport,” The Los Angeles Times, 
May 4, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-
russia-space-20160504-story.html. See also The Moscow Times, 
“Russian Director Responsible for Vostochny Gets Prison 
Sentence,” April 29, 2016, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/
Corruption, opaque attribution of contracts 
(no tender), and lack of accountability provoke 
acute management crises that call for “manual 
control” by the leader.34 This is one of the caveats 
of centralization of decision in the hands of a 
few. Even administration bosses no longer have 
authority and capability. They are officially 
empowered by a presidential decree and a 
government order, then not given the budgetary 
means to govern effectively.35 
Ukraine demonstrates that a seemingly “no-
alternative” regime can fall when it no longer 
delivers minimal security and decent living 
standards. The challenge from Maidan and the fall 
of Yanukovych, followed by constitutional change, 
is that it breaks the myth that there is no alternative 
to the Putin system. If the Ukrainians could fight 
and win alternative rule, why not the Russians? 
Loyalty
By and large, the upper echelons of society go with 
the flow, and apparently remain loyal, but do not 
trust Putin’s confrontational strategy. They have 
much to lose from further domestic aggravation 
and continued isolation from Western societies. 
Hyper-nationalist propaganda creates fear and 
populist retrenchment in a large section of the 
public, but such xenophobic hysteria may be short-
lived. Most Russian scholars, journalists, experts, 
and former government officials interviewed 
for this study emphasize the volatility of public 
emotions “if things go very wrong” (a major 
accident, epidemics, war, local social unrest), and 
news/article/russian-director-responsible-for-vostochny-gets-
prison-sentence/567494.html.
34 M. Lipman and N. Petrov, eds., Russia: Scenarios for 2020 
(London: Palgrave, 2015), and N. Petrov, “Putin’s Downfall: 
The Coming Crisis of the Russian Regime,” European Council 
on Foreign Relations, April 19, 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/
publications/summary/putins_downfall_the_coming_crisis_of_
the_russian_regime7006. 
35 Insight from Igor Fedyukin, former deputy minister of educa-
tion (2012-13).
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the vulnerabilities of Putin’s ruling system, a system 
that no longer delivers what society expects.36
There are different shades in the wide spectrum of 
loyal attitudes, from full participation in serving 
the leadership to passive resistance and muffled 
criticism among many in administration, and 
intelligentsia and among corporate/economic 
managers. As Nikolay Petrov aptly explains, “elites’ 
attitudes depend on their degree of dependence 
on the ruling circles, and on the capacity of the 
latter to reward loyal servants, and to punish 
restive ones. Active loyalty is doubly rewarded, as 
more and more among the upper middle class bow 
their head, but do not commit to any big effort in 
service of the country’s economy.”37 Sociologist 
Lev Gudkov, director of the Levada-Center, 
explains that the leadership is trying to drive a 
wedge between the half of Russians that are paid 
by the state, even if less-well than before, and those 
Russians who work in the non-state sector or are 
self-employed. The latter form a disparate group. 
Many work in companies that depend on state 
orders, or are managed by civil servants. Others 
work independently from the state and quasi-state 
structures, and their situation varies according to 
sectors, markets, and regional location. However, 
Gudkov stresses, they all share a sense of insecurity, 
as they do not believe that the national economy 
will improve in the near future.38 
As state and state-related economic activities are 
centralized and monopolistic, more independent 
36 Author’s interviews with Elena Racheva, journalist for 
Novaya Gazeta; Konstantin Sonin, economist at Chicago Harris 
School and former professor at the New Economic School in 
Moscow; Igor Fedyukin, former deputy minister of education; 
and Vladislav Inozemtsev, economist, formerly close to Dmitry 
Medvedev’s team in 2008-11.
37 Conversation with the author, Washington, DC, April 27, 
2016.
38 Conversation with the author, Levada-Center, Moscow, May 
31, 2016. See also Levada-Center opinion polls, in particular the 
assessment of national indicators: http://www.levada.ru/indika-
tory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/.
actors are hit by the decline of the state sector, 
and find themselves trapped by the shrinking 
of money and opportunities. Hence, they are 
experiencing a new dependence on state and 
oligarchic structures, the strongest providers 
of activity and revenues. Several examples may 
illustrate this growing dependence on state orders: 
An architect who worked mainly for foreign firms 
and private individuals no longer gets work, and 
he cannot easily switch to state commissioning as 
the budget is contracting. Another example is a 
travel agent who built his business on holidays in 
Turkey. Since the clash between Putin and Turkish 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan over the downing 
of a Russian military plane by Turkish forces, travel 
to Turkey has been forbidden for functionaries, 
and made virtually impossible for other travelers. 
Flights have been sharply reduced between the two 
countries, and the travel agency may need to close. 
In another case, a small company that produced 
technological devices for a German-Russian joint 
venture, now ended, must close or relocate to 
Germany. 
Loyalty in today’s Russia means that managers, 
directors, and influential minds abandon their 
capacity to make their own choices, and do not take 
the initiative. They are implementers, not thinkers, 
analysts, or independent actors playing a part in 
the socioeconomic evolution of their country. They 
used to give their best to government, production, 
culture, and public services, but they now adopt 
a wait-and-see attitude and try not to attract 
attention, in order to avoid the unfortunate fate of 
many in similar positions that criticized the powers 
that be. Prosecution, assets-seizure, dismissal, 
and loss of privileges and benefits are part of the 
regime’s repressive toolbox to raise the cost of those 
tempted by exile or resistance. 
Transatlantic Academy12
The structure of 
leadership and 
influential groups 
has evolved during 
the 17 years of 
Putin’s reign. From 
the initial strategy 
of reestablishing 
a “power vertical” 
in government, 
the president has 
quickly moved to 
building a network 
state, serving the 
economic and 
political interests 
of his close 
associates, and 
of the wider circle 
of administrators 
and oligarchs.
In the leadership circles, only two options really exist: stay loyal and defend Putin’s dominant rule, or leave the group — often leading to 
the obligation to leave the country. The option 
of protest, or even moderate criticism, is not an 
alternative if one wishes to protect oneself. The 
closing in of the ruling group has consequences 
for relations with society and with upper middle 
class. This is why the triangle composed of 
leadership, elites, and society is a critical, yet fragile, 
construction. 
Elite theory has long been anchored in the binary 
concept of rulers and ruled.39 In Russia, however, it 
is essential to differentiate between ruling groups 
on one hand, and elites/upper middle class on the 
other. If we adopt this broad definition of elites, 
a few million Russians belong to this loose and 
differentiated ensemble, whereas the rulers or 
“ruling groups” number in a few thousand. Under 
Putin’s authoritarian and personalized rule, the 
interconnections between the Kremlin, the people, 
and the elites weave a complex socioeconomic 
fabric that must be analyzed to see beyond the 
simplistic paradigm of the “popular autocrat” 
served by shrewd, greedy servants, indifferent to 
the rank and file.
The estrangement of elites from decision-making 
in recent years is a factor of destabilization. Since 
2012-14, Putin’s rule has drifted from a somewhat 
open system of elite participation to a closed 
fortress where a small number of individuals 
control big resources and power structures, 
and no longer communicate with economic 
and administrative elites; they seek the input of 
intellectual, scientific, and journalistic expertise, 
and they combat competent, critical analysts. 
39 K. Prewitt and A. Stone, The Ruling Elites: Elite Theory, Power, 
and American Democracy (New York, London: Harper & Row, 
1973); V. Pareto, The Rise and Fall of the Elites, (Totowa, N.J.: 
Bedminster, 1968); Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class 
(New York: Random House, 1968).
Consequently, it makes sense to detach the 
leadership from elites. What we are observing in 
Russia is the marginalization and disempowerment 
of individuals and institutions that previously had 
influence over domestic policies, in the economic, 
administrative, cultural, and social realms, as well 
as in external relations.40
A Closed Ruling Circle
The structure of leadership and influential groups 
has evolved during the 17 years of Putin’s reign (he 
became prime minister in August 1999). From the 
initial strategy of reestablishing a “power vertical” 
in government, the president has quickly moved 
to building a network state, serving the economic 
and political interests of his close associates, and of 
the wider circle of administrators and oligarchs.41 
The new “pyramidal order” announced in 2000 has 
never been seriously constructed. It was a slogan 
and deterrent, rather than a strategy of rule. It never 
led to an orderly, hierarchical, and readable system 
of checks and balances. To the contrary, since the 
May 2000 decrees, Putin has sought to solidify his 
power in selected groups and organs and to hollow 
out public institutions.42 This “de-institutionalized” 
state was to be governed by parallel structures 
and networks; some of them simply replaced, in 
practice, constitutional institutions. For example, 
the Public Chamber comprised of non-elected 
members and created in 2005, was meant to replace 
the State Duma as the locus of official debate, and 
deprived elected deputies of the little representative 
legitimacy they still had in the early 2000s. A power 
constellation, gravitating around a strong leader, in 
40 This argument was convincingly made by all speakers, in 
particular Nikolay Petrov, Sergey Aleksashenko, Kirill Rogov, 
and Igor Fedyukin, at the conference “Can Russian Elites Sustain 
Putin’s Foreign Policy?” Transatlantic Academy, Washington, 
DC, April 25, 2016.
41 M. Mendras, Russian Politics: The Paradox of a Weak State, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); K. Dawisha, Putin’s 
Kleptocracy.
42 M. Mendras, Russian Politics.
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lieu of administrative hierarchy, fuels corruption. 
The public and private spheres are more and 
more entangled, and decisions from above are 
increasingly opaque and arbitrary.
Impunity makes rulers free from accountability 
to citizens. Arbitrary rule constitutes a prime 
obstacle to foreign and domestic investments in 
the economy. Recent repressive legislation and 
regulations have aggravated an already critical 
situation. William Pomeranz of the Kennan 
Institute argues that the increased dependence 
of judges, and the unrestrained corruption that 
ensues, makes even a slight improvement toward 
rule-of-law unlikely: “Russia’s small legal elite, 
in particular the procuracy, has continued the 
tradition of serving the state, as opposed to the law 
itself, thereby making it difficult, if not impossible, 
to discipline Russia’s political leaders… One 
might think that the Ministry of Justice would be 
a part of the legal elite, but it is decidedly not. It is 
primarily an administrative organ — it oversees 
layers, notaries, prisons, NGOs, the legalization of 
documents, and so forth.”43 Judges are appointed 
by Putin and well paid; they receive bonuses for 
“good” decisions. It is important to know that in 
Russian courts, in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, the accused is found guilty and sentenced. 
Prosecutors are absolutely loyal to the regime. This 
situation contributes to the general degradation 
of institutions, unaccountable government, and 
further economic decline.
Putin’s power was patiently constructed on several 
organizational pillars and networks, not just the 
inner circle of friends, new oligarchs, and former 
KGB officers. The president could rely on obedient 
public institutions, dependent courts, hydrocarbon 
state monopolies, other big state-controlled 
companies, and an extensive security system 
43 W. Pomeranz, “Russia’s Missing Legal Elite,” presentation at a 
conference “Can Russian Elites Sustain Putin’s Foreign Policy?” 
Transatlantic Academy, Washington, DC, April 25, 2016.
comprised of army, intelligence services, police, and 
Interior Ministry special forces. Until the political 
protest of the winter 2011-12, he confidently rested 
on the loyalty of elites and the relative passivity of 
voters. Putin’s constellation used to be wider and 
encompass significant segments of economic elites 
and intelligentsia, beyond the networks of friends, 
siloviki, and loyal oligarchs. Since the Ukrainian 
conflict, the leadership has monopolized power and 
resources, controled economic and social life more 
tightly, and deprived elites of the relative autonomy 
that they previously enjoyed and cuts them out of 
policymaking. The Kremlin no longer tolerates 
even limited autonomy of medium and big, 
companies, media, NGOs, which can no longer rely 
on credit, investment, or expertise from abroad, 
and have to give preference to a national bank or 
institution in seeking cooperation.44 The rules of 
the game are changing, and elites outside the ruling 
group have trouble adjusting to the new, more 
unpredictable context. With recession and higher 
military expenditures, the opacity of decision-
making is bound to fuel resentment among 
elites, which have much to lose in a protracted 
confrontation with the West, and further recession. 
A Shrinking Middle Class
As was argued earlier, the majority in the upper 
middle class and professional elites tend to adjust. 
But they do so by stepping back from power 
positions, standing on the margin, and waiting 
for the storm to quiet down. The split between 
the Kremlin and the elites/upper middle class is 
widening, and may become problematic for the 
Putin regime. The leadership-elites-society triangle 
is changing shape. The ruling group is retracted and 
aloof, and closed to any new recruits. The elites are 
more differentiated and divided, and partly exiled. 
Society is now more cut off from both elites-upper 
44 Conversation with Russian and U.S. financial consultants in 
Moscow, May 2016. 
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middle class, and the outside world, and the middle 
class is shrinking.
It is too early to measure the precise impact of 
economic recession, sanctions and counter-sanctions 
on the Russian middle class in terms of assets, 
revenues, and living standards. Official statistics, 
coupled with independent data, clearly point to 
a decline in revenues on average, and seem to 
indicate that most segments of society are hit by the 
economic crisis to varying degrees. The key elements 
to watch are real wages, savings, consumption, 
and access to good education and health services. 
“Consumer confidence in Russia fell to 63 points 
in the first quarter of 2016 on Nielsen’s Consumer 
Confidence Index, the lowest level since records 
began in 2005,” Kommersant newspaper reported 
in April 2016.45 “In the same period in 2015, the 
index stood at 72 points. According to Nielsen, a 
record low number of people now have any extra 
money after covering basic needs and bills. At the 
same time, the share of Russians forced to slash their 
spending rose to 76 percent in the first quarter of the 
year.” About 60 percent of Russian citizens now have 
to abstain from entertainment expenses and put off 
the purchase of new clothes; and 50 percent have to 
buy cheaper food. Real wages shrank approximately 
10 percent in 2015, and the downtrend is continuing 
in 2016, according to the state statistics service. 
According to deputy prime minister Olga Golodets, 
“51 percent of purchased items in February 2016 
were food products while the consumption of certain 
types of light industry has fallen by 20 percent.”46 
Lower incomes mean lower consumer activity.47 
45 The Moscow Times, “Russian Consumer Confidence Falls to 
Historic Lows,” April 29, 2016, http://www.themoscowtimes.
com/business/article/russian-consumer-confidence-falls-to-
historic-lows/567532.html. 
46 The Moscow Times, “Russian Consumer Confidence Falls to 
Historic Lows.”
47 Research on the social impact of recession is conducted at the 
Higher School of Economics’ sociology department and demo-
graphics center, and at the Levada-Center in Moscow. 
Public Opinion, or Public Emotion?
Given the bleak economic picture, a critical 
assessment of opinion polls, and of Putin’s high 
ratings, is in order. Russians live in a world of 
negative emotions, worked up by television and 
official speech. They express emotions rather than 
a clear political understanding of the situation. 
Putin is not popular in the sense of being preferred 
to another politician, as no contender is allowed 
to speak on television and no alternative policies 
are discussed. He represents the embodiment 
of “public order” and “national identity.” Many 
Russians cannot even think about “Russia after 
Putin” because they want to keep a roof above their 
heads and they fear change. Still, they might turn 
less supportive of Putin if things go from bad to 
worse.48
A posteriori, Crimea clearly appears to be a unique 
episode of nationalist fervor, which the conflict 
in Donbas failed to maintain at such intensity in 
2015. The annexation was embraced by a large 
majority of Russians, of all social categories, who 
cried together with Putin: “Krym nash!” (Crimea is 
ours!). But by the end of 2014, Russians’ responses 
to pollsters evolved from outright support for 
intervention to anxiety about war and insecurity. 
“Russia’s ambitious foreign policy began to be 
considered not as an achievement but as a source 
of the threat of military conflict,” Mikhail Dmitriev 
explains.49 People do not like confrontation, and 
worry about their material security and living 
standards. Putin may have a strong rating, but he 
is not trusted as capable of pulling the country out 
of the slump. Henry Hale of George Washington 
University notes that the “rally around the leader” 
has limits, and does not express the profound 
48 Conversations with Denis Volkov, Kirill Rogov, and Lev 
Gudkov, in Washington or Moscow, May-June 2016.
49 I. Nechepurenko, “Predicting the Future With Russia’s 
Economic Nostradamus,” The Moscow Times, March 18, 2015, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/predicting-the-
future-with-russias-economic-nostradamus/517659.html.
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distrust of Russians in their own government and 
social system.50 
A majority of Russians consider the 
impoverishment of citizens and rising prices to 
be the major threats facing the country. The other 
threats that Russia currently faces, according 
to respondents, include the economic crisis (49 
percent) and rising unemployment (35 percent). 
More than 80 percent of Russians believe there is an 
economic crisis in Russia; about 20 percent say the 
crisis will last for a long time. Only 12 percent of 
the respondents believe there is no financial crisis 
in Russia.51 Even the pro-Kremlin public opinion 
center VsTIOM rings the alarm, writing that 40 
percent of the population expects the situation to 
worsen further.52 The Levada-Center publishes 
findings on the socioeconomic preoccupations 
of the average Russian, and the latter’s suspicion 
that the current government and regional 
administrations will not alleviate their hardships.53 
For Putin, it is essential to retain very high poll 
ratings, at all costs. He is probably aware of the 
limited representativeness of such results, as 
Russians are not asked if they prefer X to Y but 
whether they support Putin’s work as president. In 
a non-pluralist regime, no alternative figure can 
50 H. Hale, “Rallying Behavior in Conflict: Evidence from a Panel 
Survey in Russia 2012-15,” paper presented at George Wash-
ington University, February 22, 2016.
51 The poll was carried out between December 2015 and 
January 2016 among 1,600 Russian residents in 48 regions. The 
Moscow Times, “Majority of Russians Consider Impoverish-
ment Country’s Main Threat,” February 12, 2016, http://www.
themoscowtimes.com/business/article/majority-of-russians-
consider-impoverishment-countrys-main-threat/559298.html. 
52 Quoted by Vladimir Milov, “From Disapproval to Change: 
Russia’s Population May Surprise Putin at Next Elections,” 
Martens Centre for European Studies, June 2016, http://www.
martenscentre.eu/publications/disapproval-change-russias-
population-may-surprise-putin-next-elections. See VsTIOM 
polls at http://www.wciom.com. 
53 Levada-Center polls, www.levada.ru, for example attitudes 
toward government and administration: http://www.levada.ru/
indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/. See also V. Milov, “From 
Disapproval to Change.”
publicly contest the incumbent. Moreover, it is 
risky to criticize the Kremlin’s policy in a time of 
“national defense against foreign threats.” Precisely 
because he wants no rival, and no successor, Putin 
needs to protect himself behind the shield of 
“plebiscitary approval” in polls, which is far larger 
than the percentage he ever really won in elections 
in the first round.54 He wants to demonstrate that 
the people gather around him, and just him. He 
thus cuts short any audible criticism from the 
ruling groups. As political geographer and election 
specialist Dmitri Oreshkin says: “This is all theatre, 
but every actor needs to pretend the stage is real 
life.”55
Opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza argues 
that the creation of a new National Guard in the 
spring of 2016 is in part motivated by the Kremlin’s 
urge to fully control the Duma elections in 
September: 
“According to its statute, the National Guard 
will have the right to arrest people and enter 
their homes; use force and shoot ‘without 
warning’; and employ armored vehicles 
and water cannons in the event of ‘mass 
disturbances’—a Kremlin term for street 
protests that followed rigged elections in 
other post-Soviet states, including Ukraine. 
Given all these preparations, one cannot help 
but ask: does this really look like the behavior 
of a government that has, as it claims, ‘89 
percent’ popular support?”56
54 K. Rogov, “Triumphs and Crises of Plebiscitary Presiden-
tialism,” in L. Aron, ed., Putin’s Russia, pp. 83-105.
55 Conversation with the author, Moscow, May 30, 2016. 
56 V. Kara-Murza, “Kremlin Leaves Nothing to Chance as Elec-
tion Nears,” Institute of Modern Russia, April 28, 2016, http://
www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/vladimir-kara-murza/
kremlin-leaves-nothing-chance-election-nears. 
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With the economic decline, carrots have grown scarcer, and smaller. Consequently, the leadership waves 
sticks more often and more prominently than 
before Crimea and the confrontation with the West. 
Moreover, many among ruling circles and elites are 
victims of Western sanctions, directly or indirectly. 
Aside from asset freeze and visa denial, they also 
suffer from investment crunch and rapidly closing 
foreign opportunities. 
Clearly, the leadership is not busy devising a 
new strategy to reconquer the trust of national 
elites. And its response to the domestic crisis is 
inadequate. Through early 2016, the Kremlin’s 
response to domestic challenges has been a 
combination of denial and wait-and-see, just 
putting patches on the most urgent problems 
(such as raising pensions). This posture may 
be untenable as economic prospects are not 
brightening, and more Russians are becoming 
aware of it. Even government-controlled media 
now discuss stagnation, falling revenues, and 
uneven development across the Russian Federation. 
Struggling against the new odds, the Putin 
leadership is using several instruments:
• Economic emergency plans, prioritization of 
investment and spending in the immediately 
lucrative sectors (hydrocarbons, arms industry, 
agro-business), and reorientation toward newer 
markets and partners in Asia.
• Political protectionism, served by repression, 
and growing media and Internet control, and 
leading to more stagnation.
• Courting or sanctioning elites to divide and rule, 
driving a wedge between the loyal and the less 
loyal or “traitors.”
• Foreign policy as a distraction from domestic 
stagnation, and as a means to reinforce the 
police nature of the regime.
• Nationalist, war-scare propaganda pointing at 
“enemies” as responsible for the confrontation. 
Emotional propaganda creates fear, but stifles 
political, economic, and social development.
• Propaganda and subversion abroad in an 
attempt to divide elites and ruling groups in 
Europe.
This strategy does not seem to be quite as 
productive as expected, as the Russian authorities 
are now encouraging businessmen, diplomats, 
experts, artists, and journalists to engage with 
European and U.S. counterparts. The new “reaching 
out” started in the spring of 2016, with many events 
organized in Russia and abroad where discussions 
are more open than anytime since the Ukraine 
crisis erupted. Criticism of the government, 
and even the president of Russia, is voiced “off 
the record.” The explanation for these overtures 
may well be that the authorities understand how 
difficult it will be for the economy to sustain a long, 
isolating confrontation with European neighbors.
Great power resurgence has not yielded the 
expected success. Donbas remains a bone of 
contention between Moscow and Western capitals. 
Direct military intervention in Syria has forced the 
U.S. administration to co-host conflict-resolution 
talks with the Kremlin, and has reestablished frail 
direct lines of contact between the U.S. and Russian 
presidents. The end of Washington’s rebuff of Putin 
is a relief to him, but it remains a fragile connection 
without trust. Domestic affairs and foreign policy 
are, more than ever, tightly intertwined, and pose 
new challenges to the ruling group in keeping 
elites and society onboard. Confrontation with 
Western countries and sanctions has proven 
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costly in economic and social terms.57 Closing the 
ranks and controlling elites will continue to be the 
Kremlin’s main tactics. This paper has indicated 
that the biggest vulnerability of Putinism is the 
difficulty to deliver what the elites and middle class 
expect in the short and medium term: adequate 
living standards and a peaceful orderly climate to 
continue to function, produce, and preserve their 
positions. Undoubtedly, challenges are coming 
from inside, not outside, but they are presented to 
the public as external threats.
The strategic question for Western governments 
and business is not so much when the Putin system 
57 See also M. Mendras, “The Rising Cost of Russia’s Authori-
tarian Foreign Policy,” in M. Light and D. Cadier, eds., Russia’s 
Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015); M. Mendras, “The West and 
Russia: From Acute Conflict to Long-Term Crisis Manage-
ment,” in D. Hamilton and S. Meister, eds., The Eastern Question: 
Russia, the West, and Europe’s Grey Zone, Center for Trans-
atlantic Relations and German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP), 2016, pp. 133-140.
might explode or implode, but how the process of 
self-disintegration and inner conflict will lead to 
dangerous breaking points. European countries 
are confronted with the uncertain development 
of Ukraine and other in-between states, like 
Georgia, Moldova, and Belarus. They have high 
stakes in finding common grounds with Moscow 
on easing tensions and ensuring relative peace in 
their vulnerable Eastern neighbors. But they have 
learned a hard lesson with Crimea and Donbas, 
and will not lift sanctions and go back to status quo 
ante unless the Russian president makes significant 
progress in his position. Western policymakers 
would be well advised to take into account anxiety 
and expectations among Russia’s elites, middle 
class, and society more broadly. They will continue 
to negotiate with the current leadership, but should 
also engage with alternative elites. In the long run, 
the Russian people, and not just the Kremlin, are 
Europeans’ neighbors and potential partners.
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